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We augment standard log earnings equations for workers in US
manufacturing with variables reflecting measured and unmeasured
attributes of their employer. Using panel employee-establishment
data, we find that establishment-level employment, education of co-
workers, capital equipment per worker, and firm-level R&D inten-
sity affects earnings substantially. Unobserved characteristics of em-
ployers captured by employer fixed effects also contribute to the
variance of log earnings, although less than unobserved characteris-
tics of individuals captured by individual fixed effects. The observed
and unobserved measures of employers mediate the effects of indi-
vidual characteristics on earnings and increase earnings inequality
through sorting of workers among establishments.
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I. Introduction
Standard earnings equations relate log earnings of individuals to their
measured human capital or demographic attributes.1 These equations ac-
count for a sizable proportion of the variation in individual earnings but still
leave a sufficiently large residual among workers with the same measured
characteristics to challenge “the law of one price” in the US labor market.
Exemplifying the dispersion of earnings for workers with similar skills,
Devroye and Freeman (2001) found that variance of log earnings among
US workers within narrow bands of adult literacy test scores exceeded
the variance of earnings among allworkers in theUnitedKingdom, theNeth-
erlands, and Sweden. Much of the increased earnings inequality in the
United States from the 1970s to the 2000s, moreover, has taken the form
of increased inequality among workers with the same measured human cap-
ital or demographic attributes.
What underlies the level and change in the residual variance from log
earnings equations? One identifiable factor is the firm or establishment that
employs theworker. The simplestmarket-clearingmodels postulate either a
single wage or a narrow band of wages associated with costs of information
and mobility among jobs for workers with comparable skills, but the evi-
dence often shows that employers pay sizable differences for workers with
the same measured attributes.2 Commensurately, the same worker often
earns substantially more or less working for different employers in closely
aligned periods of time.
II. ANOVA of Establishment Earnings
To see the extent to which earnings of individuals depend on where they
work in the United States in recent years, we analyzed the log earnings of
individual workers in the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics
(LEHD) Employment History Files for the nine states with LEHD data
from 1992 through 2007.3We decomposed the total variance of log earnings
into a part attributable to differences in earnings among establishments and
a part due to differences in earnings of workers within establishments. To
keep as many observations as possible on each individual for panel data anal-
1 We use “attributes” and “characteristics” interchangeably in this paper.
2 Earlier studies include Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), Groshen (1991), Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Lane, Salmon, and Spletzer (2007), Gruetter and
LaLive (2009), Nordström Skans, Edin, and Holmlund (2009), Card, Devicienti,
and Maida (2014), Barth et al. (2016), and Song et al. (2015) as well as the contribu-
tions in Lazear and Shaw (2009).
3 See Sec. III.A below for details.
tial information is disclosed. Contact the corresponding author, Richard B. Free-
man, at freeman@nber.org. Information concerning access to the data used in this
paper is available as supplementary material online.
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ysis, we included all jobs observed in the second quarter of each year in the
LEHD.We estimated establishment effects by regressing the log earnings of
individuals on establishment dummies separately for each year and then used
the variance of the estimated coefficients on establishment dummies to mea-
sure the variance of log earnings due to the between-establishment effect. The
remaining variance reflects earnings differences within establishments and
interactions between individuals and establishments. Since the ANOVA
does not adjust earnings for the measured attributes of individuals within
establishments or for establishment differences in average worker attributes
or observable establishment attributes, the calculations are a descriptive rep-
resentation of the raw earnings data.
Table 1 displays the results of the ANOVA for 1992–2007 for the whole
US economy and for eight large one-digit sectors. The columns give the to-
tal variance of individual earnings in 1992 and 2007, the share of the variance
attributable to variance among establishments, the change in variance over
time, and the share of the change attributable to increased variance of earn-
ings among establishments. The first line shows that in the economy as a
whole 48% of the variance of log earnings among workers comes from var-
iation among establishments and that 66%of the 0.091 increased variance of
earnings is due to the increase in variance among establishments.4
Table 1
Variance Decomposition of Log Earnings, All Sectors, 1992 and 2007
Variance
Log
Earnings Share of Variancebetween Establish-
ments, 2007
Change in
Variance,
1992–2007
Share of Growth
between Establish-
ments, 1992–20071992 2007
All .510 .601 .48 .091 .66
Mining, utilities,
and transport .434 .457 .40 .022 .39
Business services .612 .713 .56 .101 .86
Communication .502 .634 .40 .132 .53
Retail, wholesale,
and restaurants .508 .551 .48 .044 .80
Finance, insurance,
and real estate .531 .660 .39 .129 .65
Private services .427 .482 .49 .054 .90
Health, education,
and social services .495 .508 .27 .013 2.15
Manufacturing .398 .490 .45 .092 .57
NOTE.—Numbers are calculated from yearly regressions of log annualized sum of quarterly earnings for
all jobs in the second quarter of the year on establishment dummies. Data are from the Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics. Establishment is the SEINUNIT.
4 These estimates are nearly identical to those in Barth et al. (2016) based on anal-
ysis of full-year main jobs, which found that 49% of variance of log earnings was
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The remaining lines of table 1 show differences in the level and change in
the variance of log earnings among sectors. Variance is highest in business
services and in finance, insurance, and real estate and is lowest in manufac-
turing; in mining, utilities, and transportation; and in private services. The
share of the total variance associated with establishments is largest in busi-
ness services and private services and is lowest in health, education, and
social services. Manufacturing, on which this paper focuses, has lower var-
iance of earnings than the economy as awhole, is close to the economy-wide
share of variance associated with earnings differences among establish-
ments, and has a lower establishment share of the 1992–2007 increase in var-
iance.
What employer attributes determine whether an employer pays above-
or below-average market wages? How much do the individual attributes
in standard log earnings equations and unobserved individual attributes as-
sociated with earnings affect the contribution of the employer effects on the
variances shown in table 1?What economic forces compress earnings across
employers? What forces increase divergence? Do earnings differentials as-
sociated with worker characteristics differ by employer enough to contrib-
ute to the overall dispersion of earnings?
We examine these questions for manufacturing. We focus on manufac-
turing because of the quality of data on that sector: the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers (ASM) provides information on manufacturing establish-
ments annually that is unavailable for other sectors and detailed evidence
on investment in capital and other inputs that are likely to affect labor pro-
ductivity across establishments, potentially leading to heterogeneity of pay
through some kind of rent-sharing mechanism.5 For our analysis, we com-
bined individual earnings from the LEHD with data on worker attributes
from the decennial census and the Current Population Survey (CPS), data
on establishment attributes from the Census of Manufacturing, and data
on firm attributes from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and
the Survey of Industrial Research and Development (SIRD).6
5 The literature on rent sharing relates individual earnings to establishment/firm
productivity or profitability; see, e.g., Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999),
Margolis and Salvanes (2001), Dunne et al. (2004), Faggio, Salvanes, and van Reenen
(2010), Dobbelaere andMairesse (2010), Mortensen, Christensen, and Bagger (2010),
and Card, Heining, and Kline (2013).
6 These data measure firm employment, establishment employment, capital per
worker, percentage of output exported overseas, and R&D per employee. We
use data on the individuals in each establishment to estimate the average character-
istics of the establishment workforce: years of schooling, age, gender, and race.
associated with variance of earnings in 2007 and that 67% of the increase in labor
earnings inequality from 1992 to 2007 was due to the increased variance of earnings
among establishments.
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III. Methodology
The traditional human capital earnings equation (Mincer 1974) relates
earnings wit of individual i in period t to observable measures/indicators
of personal skill and other individual characteristics that ideally reflect pro-
ductivity but that may also reflect employer attitudes or perceptions result-
ing from prejudicial or statistical discrimination:
logwit 5 b0 1 gt 1 xitb 1 uit, (1)
where gt is a period effect and xit is a vector that includes years of schooling
and individual attributes such as age, gender, and race. The equation does
not include attributes of the establishment or firm, although they can be
added to the equation to reflect compensating differential or other factors
related to the full compensation of workers that are not captured by the
earnings measure.
Our augmented earnings equation adds the measured and unmeasured
characteristics of an individual’s establishment/firm to equation (1):
lnwijt 5 b0 1 gt 1 xitb 1 zj itð Þtd 1 wij itð Þ 1 eijt, (2)
where j(it) is an index of the workplace that employs individual i at time t
and wij(it) is a unique job fixed effect for every individual and workplace pair.
For clarity of exposition, we omit the (it) index and write only the index j to
indicate the workplace that employs individual i at time t in the following.
The t subscript on zjt allows observed employer characteristics to vary over
time at a workplace, which could potentially affect the earnings of workers.
Our analysis assumes that an employer characteristic affects the earnings of
all workers similarly. With a panel of workers and employers, the d coeffi-
cients for the establishment characteristics are estimable using within-job
variation in employer characteristics—for example, if z relates to employ-
ment (“larger establishments paymore”), the effect of employment on earn-
ings can be estimated for workers in the same job when the establishment
changes employment.
Having multiple observations on a person along with employer identifi-
ers in longitudinal data allows us to decompose the job effect into an indi-
vidual fixed effect via a dummy variable for each worker, an establishment
fixed effect via a dummy variable for each employer, and a match compo-
nent orthogonal to the individual and establishment fixed effects per the
Abowd-Kramarz-Margolis (AKM) decomposition (Abowd et al. 1999):
wij 5 ai 1 fj 1 yij. Defining ai 5 XiB 1 ai and fj 5 ZjD 1 Jj, where X
and Z are covariates for each individual and establishment, we identify
the B andD parameter vectors by assuming that the residual of the individ-
ual fixed effect is orthogonal to individual fixed characteristics and that the
residual of the establishment fixed effect is orthogonal to establishment
fixed characteristics. However, the components of both fixed effects can
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correlate with time-varying characteristics and each other. Our final aug-
mented equation is
lnwijt 5 b0 1 gt 1 xitb 1 XiB 1 ai 1 zjtd 1 ZjD 1 Jj 1 yij 1 eijt
5 b0 1 gt 1 qit 1 Qjt 1 yij 1 eijt,
(3)
where qit is the individual component of the earning and Qjt is the establish-
ment component, both of which contain observable and unobservable
parts.
Comparing equations (1) and (3), if personal skills and attributes are the
sole factors included in the estimation, the coefficients of equation (1) esti-
mate the gross return to those skills/attributes inclusive of possible gains
from access to different employers, whereas the coefficients of equation (3)
measure the net return exclusive of the earnings characteristics of employers.
Alternatively, to the extent that the covariates in equation (1) are correlated
with the equation (2) variables, the estimated coefficients of (1) can be viewed
as biased estimates of the net effects of skills/attributes in equation (2).
A. Matched LEHD, Establishment, and Firm Data
As noted, our dependent variable is the earnings of individual workers in
the LEHD Employment History Files for the nine states with LEHD data
from 1992 through 2007.7 We link the LEHD to the quinquennial Census
of Manufacturers (CoM) for the economic census years 1992, 1997, 2002,
and 2007 and to the ASM in intermediate years, using the LEHD Business
Register Bridge that links data at the firm level. LEHD establishments are
linked by firm, detailed industry, and county toCoM/ASM establishments.
For the vast majority of observations—single-unit firms and plants of a firm
located in a different county than other plants of the firm in the same indus-
try—the mapping from LEHD to CoM/ASM establishments is unique
within detailed industry and county. But for plants of a firm in the same in-
dustry and county, the link is not one to one. For these establishments, we
aggregate plant characteristics to the firm-industry-county level and link
these measures to their workers.
The COM/ASM data provide production-related data onmanufacturing
establishments, which we add to the files on employees: number of workers
7 The LEHD data provide annualized quarterly earnings from the unemploy-
ment insurance benefit programs, linked to the Quarterly Census of Employment
and Wages. We only use observations that include positive earnings in the second
quarter of the year. Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) describe the construction
of the LEHD data. The nine states are California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Mary-
land, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. They cover approxi-
mately half of US employment. Comparisons with data for states that cover differ-
ent time periods show that the nine-state sample is reasonably representative (Barth
et al. 2016).
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at establishments and establishment capital equipment and building stock as
constructed by Foster, Grim, andHaltiwanger (2016) with perpetual inven-
tory methods. We measure firm employment from the LBD and whether a
firm reports R&D expenditures and the amount from the SIRD. Table A1
gives summary statistics for our key variables.
We obtain measures of the years of schooling, occupation, age, race, and
gender of workers in the LEHD by linking workers to their characteristics
in the 1990 and 2000 decennial census long form and March CPS files for
1986–1997. The Census Center for Administrative Records staff matched
these data using the protected identification key (PIK) identifier, which is
the person identifier in the Census, the CPS, and the LEHD. Beginning
with 2000, decennial files have very high PIK match rates, of 90%–93%
(Mulrow et al. 2011; Rastogi and O’Hara 2012). However, the 1990 PIK
is more limited due to the vintage of address files.8 Matching Census/CPS
data to theLEHDEmploymentHistoryFiles provides uswith data onyears
of schooling and other worker attributes for 20.5% of employees in the
LEHD data.9 In the matched sample, we require that a person is observed
at least four times.
Table A1 shows that thematching process produces a sample that is higher
in earnings andworker attributes that are positively associated with earnings,
such as age and being white, and a sample that is also higher in firm and es-
tablishment attributes that are positively associated with earnings, such as
number of employees and capital per employee.
IV. Variance Decomposition in Manufacturing
Table 2 gives a variance decomposition for the subset of manufacturing
workers for whom we match observations in the LEHD and CoM to de-
cennial census or CPS files. This is the sample on which the rest of our anal-
ysis focuses. The increase in variance in the subsample falls short of the in-
crease in the full LEHD—a variance of 0.272 compared with the table 1
figure of 0.398 in 1992 and a variance of 0.330 compared with 0.490 in
2007, producing a smaller increase in variance over time. A major reason
is that the matched sample loses many small establishments where earnings
are relatively low. The proportion of the variance in log earnings attribut-
able to between-establishment differences is as a result lower as well. The
43% contribution of increased earnings between establishments in the
matched sample is smaller than the 57% in the full LEHD. The matched
8 Individual name and address files are highly sensitive and are not generally dis-
tributed in the US Census Bureau with the data files. Our versions of 1990 decen-
nial files did not have original name and address data and had to be reconstructed
with other data sets. As a result, the PIK matches favor less mobile adult heads of
household.
9 We first matched to the 2000 Census, then matched missing cases to the 1990
Census, and finally matched missing cases to the CPS data.
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sample understates the contribution of establishments to the variation in
earnings.
As establishments belong tofirms that include other establishments, all of
which may be covered by firm-wide human resource and compensation
policies, we decomposed the between-establishment contribution to the
variance of earnings into an effect associated with firms and an effect asso-
ciated with establishments within firms. We did this in two stages: first by
regressing log of earnings on dummy variables for establishments and then
by regressing estimated establishment fixed effects on dummy variables for
firms. The proportion of the variance attributed to firms reflects the overall
pay practices of firms, while the remaining proportion reflects pay differ-
ences among establishments in the same firm.
The table 2 calculations show that consistent with the emphasis of Song
et al. (2015) on the importance of the firm in accounting for the increased
dispersion in worker earnings over time, the firm component dominates the
variation in log earnings among establishments. In our manufacturing data,
90.4% (50.113/0.125) of the variance in earnings between establishments in
1992 is assigned to firm fixed effects and 93.3% (50.140/0.150) of the estab-
lishment variance in 2007 is similarly assigned tofirm fixed effects. Over time,
moreover, the variance in establishment earnings for establishments within
firms fell, so that 110% (50.47/0.43) of the increased earnings dispersion as-
sociated with establishment was due to increased earnings variance among
firms.10
Table 2
Variance Decomposition of Log Earnings in the Matched Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Manufacturing Panel,
1992 and 2007
Variance,
1992 Share
Variance,
2007 Share
Change,
1992–2007
Share of
Change
Log earnings .272 1 .330 1 .058 1.00
Between establishments .125 .46 .150 .45 .025 .43
Between firms .113 .42 .140 .42 .027 .47
Between establishments
within firm .012 .04 .011 .03 2.001 2.03
Within establishments .146 .54 .180 .55 .033 .57
NOTE.—Numbers are calculated from a regression of log earnings on time dummies and establishment
dummies. The matched sample includes LEHD data matched to the Census of Manufacturers with valid
observations of capital (from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers/Census of Manufacturers tfp files; see
Foster et al. 2016) and to education data from the decennial censuses and the Current Population Survey;
each individual is observed at least four times (for details, see Sec. III.A). All jobs included are observed in
the second quarter of the year. Slight differences between the “Between establishments” numbers and the
sum of “Between firms” and “Between establishments within firms” numbers are due to rounding errors.
10 Because many small firms have only a single establishment, the calculation that
assigns virtually all of the variance of single-establishment firms to the firm could
overstate the dominance of firms in establishment effects. To see how much of the
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V. Cross-Section Earnings Equations
Column 1 of table 3 records estimated coefficients and standard errors for
ordinary least squares regressions of the benchmark cross-section log earn-
ings equation with years of schooling, age, gender, and some interactions to
allow for differences in effects among those attributes. In addition, the re-
gression includes 171 geographic area dummies and 16 year dummies so
that the coefficients are estimated within year and area. The estimated coef-
ficients are similar to those typically found in the human capital earnings lit-
erature: an estimated average return to years of schooling of about 9.4%per
year and a concave age profile captured by the negative squared term and
gender and race earnings gaps at 30% and 17%, respectively. The R2 of
the equation of 0.45 is larger than the R2 in earnings functions fit on CPS
data,11 presumably because variation in earnings in the entire economy ex-
ceeds that in manufacturing and/or because the administrative LEHD earn-
ings has less measurement error than self-reported earnings in the CPS.
Column 2 adds a set of workplace variables to reflect place of employ-
ment: four-digit NAICS industry dummies, the log number of employees
of the firm, the log number of employees in the establishment, and estab-
lishment age and its square.12 The estimates show significant firm and estab-
lishment effects and a concave earning-establishment age profile. Adding
the firm and establishment characteristics raises theR2 to 0.505 and thus ex-
plains 10% of the residual variance of earnings for demographically similar
persons. The firm and establishment variables shrink the positive coeffi-
cients on years of schooling and age and the negative coefficients on gender
and being nonwhite, indicating that some of the impact of those factors
comes through sorting of workers among establishments and industries
within manufacturing.
Column 3 adds variables relating to the attributes of the establishment’s
workforce: mean years of schooling, mean age, share female, and share non-
white; capital structures per worker and capital equipment per worker; the
export share of establishment revenues; and the R&D investment of the
firm towhich the establishment belongs. Themost striking result is the high
estimated coefficient on the years of schooling of all workers. The estimated
0.069 coefficient on the mean years of schooling in the workers’ establish-
ment compared with the 0.074 coefficient on the workers’ own education
table 2 result is due to single-unit firms, we eliminated them from the data set and
decomposed the variances of earnings among multiunit establishments. Table A2
shows that among multiestablishment firms, 83% (50.094/0.113) of the variation
in establishment fixed effects is associated with the firm fixed effect, which supports
the conclusion in the text.
11 Estimating a similar regression with CPS data for the whole workforce gave an
R2 of 0.35.
12 Dickens and Katz (1987) examine industry wage differentials. Brown andMedoff
(1989) study employer size-wage effects.
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suggests that it is almost as good to work in an establishment with more ed-
ucated workers as it is to have more education. The estimates also show that
workers earn more in establishments with older workers and less in estab-
lishments with a larger proportion of female or nonwhite workers. More
capital equipment per worker raises earnings more than more capital struc-
tures per worker (a coefficient difference of 0.046 vs. 0.007), and earnings
are higher in establishments with a high export share. Finally, earnings rise
with R&D intensity of a firm: workers in firms with 1 standard deviation
higher R&D intensity average 2% more earnings.
Column 4 gives the regression results with dummy variables for firms
added to the equation, while column 5 gives results with dummy variables
for establishments replacing those for firms. With establishment fixed ef-
fects in the model, it is no longer possible to identify separately the linear
effect of establishment age and the time dummies, so we have removed
the linear term for establishment age. Since the effect of linear age is now
absorbed by the time dummies, none of the remaining estimators are affected.
Addition of the firm fixed effects substantially reduces the estimated impact
of the number of employees at the firm, indicating that short-run changes in
firm employment have little effect on earnings but only reduce the coefficient
on number of employees at the establishment modestly. The column 5 esti-
mates with dummy variables for establishment also markedly reduce the co-
efficient for firm employment but leave a substantial effect of establishment
employment on earnings. With establishment fixed effects in the equation,
the positive effect of establishment employment suggests that an establish-
ment operates along a rising supply curve of labor for short-term increases
in employment, which suggests somemonopsony power in the labor market
(Manning 2005).
Addition of the firm and establishment dummies naturally shrinks the es-
timated effect offirm and establishment variables on earnings. The column 4
firmfixed effects regression eliminates the negative relationship between the
share of nonwhite employees. Working in an establishment with a large
nonwhite share is associated with low earnings, but short-run changes in
the nonwhite share do not affect establishment earningsmuch. The column 4
fixed effects regression also greatly weakens the relationship between R&D
and earnings, reducing the estimated coefficient by more than 80%. While
R&D firms pay more than firms that do less R&D, changes in R&D activity
within a firm have little effect on earnings.
The column 5 regression, which includes establishment fixed effects, fur-
ther shrinks the coefficients of most of the establishment workforce charac-
teristics compared with those in column 3. The estimated 0.0690 effect of
the mean years of schooling on earnings in column 3 drops to 0.0249 in col-
umn 5, while the estimated 20.3176 for being female in column 3 drops to
20.1084 in column 5. While measurement error usually accounts for some
of the lower coefficient on variables in longitudinal analysis compared with
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cross-section analysis (Freeman 1984), the pooling of observations to create
average characteristics is likely to diminish measurement error so that huge
drops in the effects of these characteristics are likely to at least in part reflect
economic behavior asfirms adjust earnings to changing characteristics grad-
ually over time.
VI. Panel Earnings Equations
The longitudinal structure of the LEHD allows us to estimate the effects
of employer characteristics on earnings for the same individual in twoways:
(1) by comparing workers who remain in the same job while management
changes characteristics of the establishment or does nothing to offset changes
due to factors outside management control, such as workers retiring or quit-
ting for another job without replacing the leaver with someone similar, and
(2) by comparing workers who quit an employer with one set of characteris-
tics to join an employerwith other characteristics.Outside of recession years,
the bulk of the labormobility comes fromworker decisions tomove to a new
employer willing to hire them. In recessions, mobility depends more on the
layoff decisions of firms, with the number of layoffs increasing to approach
or exceed the number of quits.13 While our data lack information on whether
a worker left a job by quitting or by layoff, recession years are less frequent
than nonrecession years in our data, which suggests that the bulk of the
worker changes reflect quits rather than layoffs.14
Table 4 presents estimates of the effect of employer attributes on the earn-
ings of the same worker when those attributes change. Column 1 shows the
results of adding individual fixed effects to the basic log earnings regression
from column 3 in table 3 for all workers in the matched sample. The coef-
ficients on some employer variables decline with the addition of the worker
fixed effects: the estimated coefficient for average years of schooling of
workers in an establishment falls by 59% (from 0.0737 to 0.0299), suggesting
that much of the large coworker schooling effect is due to positive sorting of
workers by unmeasured individual characteristics into establishments with
more educated workers. The coefficient on the equipment stock of capital
per employee drops more massively by 70% (from 0.0462 to 0.0140), sug-
gesting positive sorting of unmeasured individual characteristics into estab-
lishments with more equipment capital. And the coefficient on R&D drops
by 83% (from 0.762 to 0.1290), suggesting that most of the cross-section
13 For nonrecession years, the number of quits divided by the number of layoffs
exceeds 1.0 by 30%–50%. In recession years, the number of layoffs exceeds quits.
See chart 7 in BLS (2015).
14 We did not probe possible differences between job changes from establish-
ments having large drops in employment, where layoffs are potentially important,
and job changes from establishments with stable or growing employment, where
the locus would likely be voluntary shifts to better outside opportunities.
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R&D effect is due to a positive matching between R&D firms and unmea-
sured individual characteristics.
The next two columns unpack the fixed effects model into its two parts.
Column 2 estimates the effect of employer characteristics on the earnings of
workers who stay in the same establishment. This specification controls for
what we call “job-individual fixed effects”—the unique combination of an
individual and the establishment, which encompasses both the establish-
ment fixed effects and the individual fixed effect from the AKM decompo-
Table 4
Estimated Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Firm and
Establishment Characteristics: Individual Fixed Effects and Job
Fixed Effects Models
Model 1:
Individual Fixed
Effects,
All Workers
(1)
Model 2:
Individual-Job
Fixed Effects,
Stayers
(2)
Model 3:
Individual
Fixed Effects,
Movers
(3)
Log firm employment .0161*** .0056*** .0162***
(.0001) (.0002) 2.0003
Log establishment employment .0305*** .0214*** .0180***
(.0002) (.0003) 2.0005
Establishment age .0037*** 2.0008***
(.0001) (.0002)
Establishment age square 2.0001*** 2.0000*** .0000
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
Mean years of schooling .0299*** .0048*** .0322***
(.0003) (.0004) 2.0008
Mean age .0023*** 2.0129*** .0023***
(.0002) (.0001) 2.0002
Share female 2.1573*** 2.0036 2.1765***
(.0020) (.0033) 2.0044
Share nonwhite .0250*** .1025*** .0230***
(.0019) (.0029) 2.0042
Export share .0000 2.0021*** .0020*
(.0003) (.0003) 2.0009
Log capital structures/employee .0059*** .0002 .0031***
(.0002) (.0003) 2.0004
Log capital equipment/employee .0140*** .0027*** .0189***
(.0002) (.0003) 2.0006
Firm R&D expenses/employee .1290*** .0860*** .2075***
(.0060) (.0057) 2.0188
r2 adjusted .873 .913 .827
N 5.13E106 5.13E106 7.31E105
NOTE.—All models include year dummies, age2, the interaction between gender and age, and the inter-
action between gender and age2. The first and third models include individual fixed effects, and the second
model includes job (i.e., match: the unique combination of individual and establishment) fixed effects.
Individual-specific variables that do not vary over time, such as years of education, are absorbed by the in-
dividual fixed effects.
* p < .05.
*** p < .001.
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sition, in addition to a potential match-specific fixed effect. As in table 3, the
linear effect of establishment age is no longer separately identified from the
time effects and is thus omitted from themodel. Column 3 estimates the im-
pact of employer factors on the earnings of workers who changed employ-
ers, which identifies the effects of establishment characteristics through
changes in the employer and thus does not control for establishment fixed
effects or match-specific effects.15
For most establishment characteristics, the column 3 estimated effects of
worker-initiated changes have a much greater impact on earnings than do
the column 2 estimated effects of employer-initiated changes. Moving to
a firm that has greater employment gives an earnings increase of 0.0162,
while working in a firm that increases employment changes gives a 0.0056
boost to earnings—about one-third as large. Moving from an establishment
with more years of schooling increases earnings by 0.0322, compared with
an increase in earnings of 0.0048 when a worker’s current establishment in-
creases its years of schooling. Moving to an establishment with older work-
ers raises the earnings of the mover, while staying in an establishment with a
rising age of the workforce reduces the worker’s earnings. The effect of
R&D on earnings is more than twice as large for movers than for stayers
(0.2075 vs. 0.0860). But not all characteristics have a larger effect for movers
than for stayers. An increase in establishment employment has a modestly
larger effect for persons who stay with an establishment than for those who
move, and similarly for the share of nonwhites.
Mechanically, the differences between the column 2 stayers-based esti-
mates and the column 3 movers-based estimates reflect the fact that the
stayers analysis controls for unobserved establishment fixed effects and
thus removes correlations between those effects and the earnings, while
themovers model does not do this. But the differences also reflect economic
behavior. A worker who chooses to change employers will likely require a
larger increase in pay to cover the costs of mobility than one who stays at a
job. An establishment that changes characteristics will likely adjust opera-
tions slowly and alter pay less in the short run compared with employers
whose characteristics differ over longer periods and whose pay structures
reflect long-term differences in the mode of operating.16
Earnings equations with individual fixed effects cannot identify the rela-
tion between stable individual characteristics and earnings: those effects are
15 For this analysis we examine every job-to-job move in the data, retaining only
the observations before and after the move, and include individual fixed effects in
the regression.
16 Measurement error will also bias downward the estimates based on changes,
for the basic reason that a given error will have a proportionately larger impact
on the small variation in year-to-year changes at the same workplace than on the
larger differences between the employer the worker joins and the employer the
worker leaves.
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absorbed in the individual dummy variables. But it is possible to learn
something about how years of schooling and demographic factors such as
gender, race, or age affect the individual fixed effects by regressing the esti-
mated fixed effect for individuals on those characteristics. Say we have
10workerswith two defining characteristics, years of schooling and gender.
The fixed effects earnings equation would produce estimated coefficients
for each of the 10workers that could be regressed on theworkers’ schooling
and gender to capture their relation to the fixed effects. Columns 1–3 of ta-
ble 5 give the results of such an analysis in three regression models. Model 1
uses estimated individual fixed effects from a regression without employer
characteristics.17 Model 2 uses estimated individual fixed effects from a re-
gression with observable employer characteristics. Model 3 uses estimated
individual fixed effects from a stayers’ regression that includes establish-
ment and match-specific fixed effects (eq. [3]). The estimated relations be-
tween the individual effects that are positively related to the characteristics
of employers decline across the columns as we add increasing information
17 The difference is that in the fixed effects specification, the unobserved individ-
ual fixed effects are allowed to be correlated with all of the included time-varying
covariates.
Table 5
Regression of Estimated Individual Fixed Effects on Years of Schooling and
Demographic Individual Characteristics from Three Models of Log Earnings
Model 1: Fixed
Effects from
Model with In-
dividual Char-
acteristics
Only
(1)
Model 2: Fixed
Effects from
Model with In-
dividual and
Establishment
Characteristics
(2)
Model 3: Fixed Ef-
fects from Model
with Individual and
Establishment
Characteristics and
Establishment Fixed
Effects
(3)
Years of schooling .1076*** .0917*** .0841***
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Dummy variable for female 2.3553*** 2.3326*** 2.3129***
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Dummy variable for nonwhite 2.1001*** 2.0882*** 2.1119***
(.0005) (.0005) (.0004)
Age .0136*** .0128*** .0112***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
Gender Nonwhite interaction .0504*** .0500*** .0429***
(.0009) (.0008) (.0007)
r2 adjusted .441 .422 .416
Variance of the estimated unobserved
individual effects .149 .127 .112
NOTE.—The dependent variable is the individual fixed effects frommodels including time-varying covar-
iates. Number of observations is 5.13E106 for all columns.
*** p < .001.
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on where the employee works. The returns to years of schooling drops
from 0.1076 for the model 1 specification that has no controls for employee
characteristics to 0.0841 for the model 3 specification that controls for ob-
served and unobserved establishment effects. The coefficient on female falls
by 12%, and the coefficient on age falls by 18%.
The bottom line in table 5 (“Variance of the estimated unobserved indi-
vidual effects”) shows how the addition of establishment characteristics re-
duces the contribution of the fixed effects for individuals to the variation of
earnings among workers. In model 1, the individual fixed effect variance is
0.149, or 51% of the total variance. In model 2, which includes measured
establishment characteristics, the individual fixed effect variance falls to
0.127, or 43% of the total variance. In model 3 with observed and unob-
served establishment characteristics, the variance of the individual effect is
0.112, or about 38% of the total variance in earnings. Put differently, estab-
lishment factors account for 25% (ð0:149 2 0:112Þ=0:149) of the variance of
estimated individual effects.
VII. A Full Decomposition
Table 6 summarizes our findings with a full decomposition of log earn-
ings in the augmented earnings equation. The standard individual character-
istics of years of schooling, age, gender, and race account for 26% of the to-
tal variation in earnings; unobserved individual effects account for 37% of
Table 6
Variance Decomposition of the Full Augmented Earnings Equation Model
Determinants of Earnings Variance Decomposition
Log earnings .299
Individual components .188
Observed individual .078
Unobserved individual .112
2  Cov(observed individual, unobserved individual) 2.002
Within-match residual .020
Establishment components .043
Observed establishment .024
Unobserved establishment .020
Unobserved firm .016
Unobserved establishment within firm .005
2  Cov(observed establishment, unobserved establishment) 2.001
2  Cov(individual components, establishment components) .038
2  Cov(observed individual, observed establishment) .022
2  Cov(observed individual, unobserved establishment) .012
2  Cov(unobserved individual, observed establishment) .008
2  Cov(unobserved individual, unobserved establishment) 2.006
Match component .010
NOTE.—Calculations used eq. (3) to structure decomposition. Number of observations is 5.13E106.
Data are for the manufacturing matched sample, as described in the text. Year dummies are not included
in the calculations. Some numbers do not add up due to rounding errors.
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the variation; observed establishment characteristics account for 8% of the
variance; unobserved establishment effects account for 7% of the variance;
and the match component accounts for 3% of the variance. The covariance
between the individual and establishment components of the earnings equa-
tion adds 13%of the variance. The remaining variation arises from the tran-
sitory within-match residual comprising 7% of the total variation and to
small negative covariance terms between the observed and unobserved parts
of the individual and establishment components, respectively.18 The most
important factors relate to individuals, but employer factors and their rela-
tion to individual factors are significant and substantive.
VIII. The Sorting of Workers between Establishments
The interaction between individual characteristics and establishment
characteristics suggests that sorting of workers with given characteristics
among workplaces with different characteristics affects inequality at large.
Positive assortative matching of workers high in measured or unmeasured
skills/wages to high-wage establishments raises the inequality of earnings.
By contrast, assortative matching of workers with workers of similar mea-
sured skill does not create “extra inequality” but points to the complemen-
tarity of skills of similar workers in the production process and allocation of
labor.
Assortative matching also affects the interpretation of estimated coeffi-
cients on particular variables. When workers positively sort by education
into higher-paying establishments, the traditional log earnings equation
that excludes establishment factors captures two effects in its estimated co-
efficient on years of schooling: the return of higher skills to earnings within
an establishment and the differential access that schooling gives workers to
obtaining jobs in higher-paying establishments. Addition of dummy vari-
ables for establishments limits the effect of years of schooling to its effect
within an establishment. Given that sorting of workers between establish-
ments affects the dispersion of pay and the returns to individual character-
istics, we analyze next the ways in which workers and firms match up.
Table 7 gives the correlation coefficients for sorting by key earnings de-
terminants. The largest correlations show considerable sorting of workers
with workers like themselves: correlations of educated workers with edu-
cated workers (0.477), of older workers with older workers (0.333), of fe-
males with females (0.349), and of nonwhites with nonwhites (0.471). But
18 Our model assumes that the fixed individual and establishment/firm effects re-
main constant throughout the sample period. Experiments with estimation on
subperiods show that in fact the variance of both the individual fixed effects and
the establishment fixed effects appear to rise during the sample period. The period
over which to treat individual and establishment/firm fixed effects as fixed raises
statistical and modeling issues and merits further analysis.
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other characteristics of employers are sufficiently correlated with worker
characteristics to suggest sorting of workers among establishments beyond
homophily. Educated workers work in large firms and in R&D-intensive
firms, in establishmentswith high capital perworker and high export shares.
These patterns make it likely that some of the education earnings premium
comes through the greater likelihood that educated workers find jobs in em-
ployers with other earning-enhancing characteristics. Older workers are also
associated with establishments with high-earning characteristics, although the
correlations are much smaller. By contrast, women work in establishments
with lower capital intensity, and nonwhite workers are largely employed in
establishments with low-earning characteristics.
The bottom two lines of the table shows the correlation between a com-
posite measure of the establishment contribution to earnings through ob-
served variables plus industry and region, weighted by their estimated effect
on earnings, and through establishment fixed effects. Both the establish-
ment observables and the fixed effects are highly correlated with years of
schooling, making schooling potentially the most important dimension of
worker sorting among establishments.
Figure 1 summarizes the relations between the characteristics of workers
and those of the establishments where they work via the correlations be-
tween indices of the observed characteristics as a group, weighted by their
respective coefficients in the earnings equation, and the fixed effects associ-
ated for workers as well as for establishments. The largest correlation is be-
tween the individual observables weighted by their contribution to earnings
and establishment observables weighted by their contribution to earnings
Table 7
Correlation Coefficients between Individual and Establishment/Firm
Characteristics
Years of Schooling Age Female Nonwhite
Log firm employment .200 .060 2.002 2.059
Log establishment employment 2.028 .149 2.014 2.028
Establishment age .214 .034 .015 2.042
Export share .103 .044 .005 2.054
Log structures capital/employee .185 .069 2.059 2.087
Log equipment capital/employee .117 .071 2.100 2.075
Firm R&D/employee .216 .015 .000 .000
Mean years of schooling .477 .031 2.030 2.128
Mean age .110 .333 2.060 2.036
Share female 2.033 2.041 .349 .105
Share nonwhite 2.146 .005 .080 .471
Establishment observables as a group,
weighted by effect on earnings .258 2.022 2.084 .030
Establishment fixed effect .112 .069 2.061 2.066
NOTE.—Coefficients are tabulated from the matched data file for manufacturing workers, as described in
the text.
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(0.253), followed by the correlation between the individual observables and
the establishment unobserved fixed effect. By contrast, the fixed effect of in-
dividuals is weakly positively correlated with the establishment observables,
while the individual unobservables and unobserved establishment fixed ef-
fects are negatively correlated—a result consistent withAbowd et al. (2014).
As Andrews et al. (2008) notes, a negative correlation between two unob-
served components of earnings could result from sampling and measure-
ment errors,19 so the safest conclusion from these correlations is that sorting
of workers occurs largely on observable characteristics.
IX. Mobility across Employers
The impact of employer characteristics on the earnings of workers with
similar measured characteristics and fixed effects and the table 7 and figure 1
correlations direct attention to the potential role of worker mobility among
employers in determining pay. To what extent does mobility from job to
job raise pay?How often do workers who start their careers in establishments
with low-earning characteristics move to firms with better observable and un-
observable characteristics over time? And conversely, howmuch downward
firm mobility is there among workers who begin their careers at firms with
high-earning characteristics?
FIG. 1.—Correlation coefficients between individual observables and unobserv-
ables with establishment observables and unobservables. Coefficients are calculated
from the matched data file for manufacturing workers, as described in the text.
FE 5 fixed effect. A color version of this figure is available online.
19 Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2013) provide further discussion of these issues.
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To examine the transitions of workers among establishments with differ-
ent establishment components of earnings, we formed a transition matrix
for workers in our data in both 1992 and 2007.We attached to every worker
the total establishment contribution to earnings, defined as the sum of the
contribution to earnings of the time-varying establishment characteristics,
such as firm size andR&D spending; the fixed observables, such as industry
and region; and the unobserved establishment effects. With an establish-
ment contribution for each worker in 1992 and 2007, the natural measure
of each worker’s mobility is the change in the establishment component
of earnings of their employer in those years.
Table 8 summarizes the transition pattern by quintiles of the distribu-
tions, ordered from low-paying firms in quintile 1 to high-paying firms
in quintile 5. The rows in the table show the distribution of workers by
the 1992 quintile distribution of their employer into the 2007 quintile dis-
tribution of their employer. While the largest probabilities are for workers
to remain in the same quintile over time, there is evidence of upward move-
ment among establishments.Workers in the low quintiles have larger shares
going up in the distribution than workers in the top quintiles have shares
falling in the distribution. Among workers in the third quintile, 38%move
to a higher quintile, whereas only 21%move down and 40% remain in the
same quintile. Newworkers come into the distribution of firms at the lower
end and change jobs over time to produce a lifetime move up the distribu-
tion. Measured by productivity of establishments rather than earnings,
Haltiwanger, Hyatt, and McEntarfer (2018, in this issue) find a similar pat-
tern in productivity, with younger workers in particular moving from less
productive to more productive firms over time.
Finally, we characterize the sorting of workers with workers between
establishments by Kremer and Maskin’s (1996) index of segregation, r 5
covðqqÞ=VðqÞ, where q is the average individual component of the es-
tablishment and V(q) is the variance of the individual components of the
Table 8
Transitions of Workers among Establishments Ordered by Establishment
Contribution to Earnings (Observable Characteristics Weighted by Their
Earnings Coefficients Plus Fixed Effect) by Quintile of the Distribution,
1992–2007
Quintile (2007) Change in Share
1992 1 2 3 4 5 All Up Down
Quintile 1 .564 .258 .097 .056 .024 1.000 .436
Quintile 2 .172 .401 .287 .108 .032 1.000 .427 .172
Quintile 3 .078 .136 .403 .329 .054 1.000 .383 .214
Quintile 4 .042 .062 .113 .451 .331 1.000 .331 .217
Quintile 5 .017 .024 .033 .136 .790 1.000 .210
NOTE.—Data are calculated on the balanced panel only. Quintiles of the distribution of the establishment
effect include both unobserved and observed components of the establishment contribution.
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standard earnings equation. If workers segregate completely between es-
tablishments according to their individual earnings components, r 5 1,
whereas if they randomly allocate between establishments, r 5 0. The in-
dex of segregation for observable characteristics in our data is 0.24, while
the index for unobservable characteristics is 0.17. This supports the impli-
cation of the correlations that sorting of workers according to observed in-
dividual characteristics, such as years of schooling, age, gender, and race, is
considerably stronger than segregation according to unobserved attributes.
We characterize the sorting of workers with establishments by the equiv-
alent Kremer-Maskin (1996) index, rQ 5 covðq, QÞ=VðqÞ, where Q is the
earnings components of establishment and divide the decomposition into
its within-establishment (Vw) and between-establishment (V b) parts by
the identities
Vw logwð Þ 5 V qð Þ 1 2 rð Þ 1 V yð Þ 1 V eð Þ, (4a)
Vb logwð Þ 5 V qð Þ r 1 2rQð Þ 1 V Qð Þ: (4b)
In our data, r 5 0:247 and rQ 5 0:100. The within-establishment com-
ponent is 59%of the variance in earnings, of which 82% arises from the ob-
served and unobserved individual component, 6% arises from the match
component, and 12% arises from the residual. The between component con-
tributes 41% of the variance in earnings, of which 36% is due to worker-
worker sorting, 30% is due to worker-establishment sorting, and 34% is due
to variance of the establishment effect. That most of the within-establishment
variation in earnings is associated with variables related to individuals and
most of the between-establishment variation in earnings is associated with
variables related to establishments and sorting of workers among establish-
ments suggests that the simple within and between decomposition offers
powerful insight into the role of supply and demand factors in earnings de-
termination.
X. Conclusion
Augmenting the earnings equation with measured characteristics of em-
ployers and unobserved earnings-related fixed effects for establishment or
firm adds substantially to the variance in log earnings explicable by an earn-
ings equation. The regressions identify observable employer-side factors—
capital equipment per worker, R&D investments, export performance, the
level of schooling of an establishment’s workforce, the number of employ-
ees, and, up to a point, the age of the establishment—associated with higher
worker earnings. While the sizable cross-section effects of measured em-
ployer characteristics diminish in longitudinal data with the inclusion of
firm and establishment fixed effects, those fixed effects are another manifes-
tation of the importance of where a person works to what they earn.
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The evidence that addition of establishment- or firm-related variables re-
duces the estimated coefficient on the key human capital variable, years of
schooling, by about one-fifth directs attention to the role of schooling in
givingworkers access to higher-payingworkplaces. The near comparability
of the estimated effect of average establishment schooling and of the indi-
vidual’s years of schooling (absent firm or establishment fixed effects) fur-
ther suggests that some of the gains from human capital investments spill
over to other workers,20 while the drop in the estimated coefficient on av-
erage years of schooling with the addition of establishment fixed effects re-
flects the strong positive relation between average years of schooling and es-
tablishment fixed effects.
The evidence that the estimated coefficients on gender, race, and age dimin-
ish when we introduce individual and establishment fixed effects provides
further support for the notion that the sorting of workers among employers
is important in earnings differentials. Youth, females, and nonwhites aremore
likely to be found in low-paying establishments, and the coefficients for the
establishment-specific average of the demographic characteristics change
signs or turns insignificant once we control for job fixed effects. While the
dynamics of worker mobility has workers moving to enterprises with higher
observable and fixed effects earnings components over time, assortative
matching tends to magnify the effect on inequality beyond what would be the
direct impact of earnings differences across establishments.
Taken together, the dual findings that where a person works affects their
earnings and that sorting ofworkers among employers accounts for some of
the differentials in earnings associated with years of schooling and demo-
graphic characteristics raises new questions for analysis: Why does having
more educated coworkers affect individual earnings so much? To what
extent do costs of mobility account for the greater impact of employee-
instituted than employer-instituted changes in the payoff fromworking with
other inputs? How important are explicit human resource and compensation
policies in positioning employers in the distribution of earnings? And do
their decisions equilibrate the marginal payoffs to paying above- or below-
market average levels of pay? Finally, given manufacturing’s modest and de-
clining share of employment, our analysis suggests the value of estimating
augmented earnings functions in other industries to see whether the role of
employers and sorting of workers found here generalizes to the labor market
writ large.
20 The relation between the average years of schooling at an establishment and
individual pay is mindful of the observed positive relation between the average level
of education at a regional or city level and earnings, which has been interpreted in
terms of human capital externalities (see, e.g., Moretti 2004).
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Appendix
Table A1
Summary Statistics: Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) of Variables for the
Full Sample of Persons in the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics
(LEHD) Manufacturing Data Set and in the Matched Sample That Includes
Measures of Years of Schooling
Full Sample Matched Sample
Mean SD Mean SD
Years of schooling 12.72 2.311
Age 42.58 10.183 43.41 9.978
Female .300 .458 .294 .456
Nonwhite .302 .459 .237 .425
Log firm employment 8.234 2.403 8.288 2.268
Log establishment employment 6.300 1.572 6.317 1.512
Log capital structures/employee 3.250 1.333 3.297 1.296
Log capital equipment/employee 3.918 1.049 3.953 1.035
Export share of establishment .626 .484 .638 .481
Firm R&D/employee .009 .021 .009 .020
Log earnings 6.649 .554 6.682 .543
Observations (in millions) 23.4 5.1
NOTE.—The full sample is tabulated for all workers in the LEHD; the matched sample is tabulated for
workers reporting years of schooling in match with the Census or the Current Population Survey, as de-
scribed in the text.
Table A2
Variance Decomposition of Earnings among Workers, in All
Firms and in Multiestablishment Firms, Matched Panel, 1992–
2007
All Share MUs Share
Log earnings .293 1 .279 1
Between establishments .119 .41 .113 .41
Between firms .106 .36 .094 .34
Between establishments .04 .06
Within firm .013 .018
Within establishments .174 .59 .166 .59
NOTE.—Firms in the “All” establishment sample include the establishment effects for
single-unit firms, whereas the “MUs” sample includes only multiestablishment firms (de-
fined as multiunit firms within manufacturing only). Numbers are calculated from a re-
gression of log earnings on time dummies and establishment dummies. The total variance
is calculated after subtracting variance due to the time dummies. Firm effects are estimated
from regression of establishment fixed effects on firm dummies. Multiunit firms are de-
fined as multiunit firms within manufacturing only.
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